This article examines how the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland could be affected by the outcome of the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014. It argues that it is currently impossible to equate a specific result in the referendum with a given outcome for the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. This is because of the complexities of the current arrangements in that policy area and the existence of several changes that presently affect them and are outside the control of the government and of the people of Scotland. This article also identifies an important paradox. In the policy domain of justice and internal security, a 'no' vote could, in a specific set of circumstances, actually lead to more changes than a victory of the 'yes' camp.
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AFSJ has arguably become the fastest growing policy field at the EU level. However, the UK has not adopted the same route of participation in the AFSJ as the overwhelming majority of Member States. Instead, it has chosen a model of selective participation in this policy area, whereby it chooses the pieces of legislation in which it wishes to participate. Such a strategy has enabled the UK to avoid being systematically subject to qualified majority voting and to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU in policy areas where it considers that its national sovereignty could be threatened (Peers 2012) . Nevertheless, the UK has chosen to opt into parts of the JHA acquis, including measures regarding irregular migration, asylum, criminal justice, policing, judicial cooperation and counter-terrorism (Hinarejos et al. 2012 ).
All these opt-in and opt-out decisions currently bind Scotland as well, as it is part of the UK.
However, the current model of justice and internal security governance in Scotland could be significantly altered by the result of the upcoming independence referendum. On 18 September 2014, the people of Scotland will be asked whether Scotland should be an independent country. This referendum could have a very significant impact, depending on its result. If Scotland were to become independent, then it would have the capacity to develop its own policies with regard to all justice and internal security issues, which could be significantly different from those adopted at Westminster. However, this may not be the only effect of independence. At the moment, it is not entirely clear what the impact of Scottish independence would be on EU membership. Although this is strongly contested by some observers, it is not entirely impossible that Scotland may find itself, at least temporarily, outside of the EU. In February 2014, the outgoing President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, even went as far as declaring that it would be 'difficult, if not impossible' for an independent Scotland to become a member of the EU (Guardian 2014b ).
The absence of EU membership would have a significant impact on the justice and internal 4 security policies of Scotland. In addition, even if there was no majority in favour of independence, a strong result for the 'yes' camp could lead to further devolution of competences to Scotland, possibly in the domain of justice and internal security.
Given the possibility of all these important changes, it is therefore surprising that relatively little attention has been given to justice and internal security matters in the referendum debates so far. This is notably evident when considering all the reports and white papers on the future of Scotland released by the Scottish government. Political debates have mainly focused on socio-economic issues, such as welfare, employment and the North Sea gas and oil revenue. When security issues have been considered, most attention has been directed towards foreign policy and defence matters. In particular, the future of the Trident nuclear submarines currently based on the Gare Loch has been at the heart of intense debates.
Academic research has also tended to focus on these same issues at the expense of justice and internal security. As a result, there has been little reflection on how the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland may be affected by the result of the upcoming Scottish independence referendum, although its impact could be very significant. Against this backdrop, the main aim of this article is to examine how the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland could be affected by the outcome of the Scottish independence referendum in September 2014.
This article argues that it is currently impossible to equate a specific result in the referendum with a given outcome for the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. This is because of the complexities of the current arrangements in that policy area and the changes that presently affect them and that are outside the control of the government and of the people of Scotland, as will be shown later in this article. To a certain extent, this can be said of most 5 policy areas, as the debates in the run-up to the referendum have highlighted that there are still question marks over a series of important issues. However, this article shows that uncertainty is particularly high when it comes to the governance of justice and internal security, because this policy area is uniquely characterised by the combination of significant devolved competences to Scotland, the granting of important competences to the EU, and the peculiar position of the UK within the AFSJ with its various 'opt-ins' and 'opt-outs'. Therefore, it is not possible to identify two main outcomes depending on whether the result of the referendum is 'yes' or 'no'. There is actually a range of possible scenarios because of the existence of parallel debates at the UK level on the extent of the UK's participation in the AFSJ (that is, the issue of the 'JHA block opt-out') and even on its actual membership of the EU.
For this purpose, this article is structured as follows. Firstly, it is necessary to present the current organisation of competences over justice and internal security issues in Scotland. This is a crucial step in the analysis because this topic is both extremely complex and, as demonstrated in the next section, largely neglected in the existing literature. Of particular interest here are two distinct issues, namely the devolution of some competences to Scotland within the UK and the UK's membership of the EU, albeit with a peculiar position within the AFSJ. Moreover, it is argued that these issues are best analysed using a multilevel governance (MLG) analytical framework, given its emphasis on the location of various competences within a given policy area at different levels of government, namely, in this case, the Scottish, British and EU levels. Once the multilevel governance of justice and internal security issues in Scotland has been presented, it is then possible to analyse the impact of the Scottish independence referendum over this policy area. The following two sections highlight two other events, the outcomes of which could interact with those of the 6 Scottish independence referendum, namely the decision of the British government regarding the JHA block opt-out and a possible referendum on the UK's membership of the EU in the years to come. The article concludes by identifying an important paradox at the heart of the debates in the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum.
Scotland and the UK within the AFSJ
Given the increasing number of competences that have been granted to the EU in the field of justice and internal security in recent years, it is necessary to locate the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland within its broader EU context. The AFSJ has seen very significant policy developments since the late 1990s (Kaunert 2010c) . As a result of the major treaty revisions decided in Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, and more recently Lisbon, as well as increased political impetus given at the European Council meetings in Tampere The rapid development of the AFSJ in recent years has led to a considerable expansion of the scholarly literature on this topic, including legal analyses (Walker 2004 , Peers, 2006 .
Most scholars have argued that the development of the AFSJ has been mainly driven by security concerns and that, as a result, freedom, justice, as well as human rights, have been neglected, if not damaged in some instances (Baldaccini et al. 2007 , Balzacq and Carrera 2006 , Huysmans 2006 , Guild and Geyer 2008 , van Munster 2009 , Bigo et al. 2010 . Other works have focused on examining EU policy developments in the field of internal security using Security Studies frameworks and concepts, such as 'homeland security' and 'comprehensive security' (Kaunert and Zwolski 2013) . Some literature has also emerged on the external dimension of the EU internal security policies. It has particularly 7 emphasised how the EU has sought and sometimes managed to influence the internal security policies of third states, in particular in its neighbourhood (Balzacq 2009, Trauner and Carrapiço 2012) .
The literature on the AFSJ in general has also been complemented by more specialised works, which have focused on specific aspects or policy dimensions of the AFSJ. In that respect, the EU counter-terrorism policy has attracted a particularly high level of attention (Spence 2007 , Eckes 2009 , Bures 2011 , Argomaniz 2011 , Kaunert and Léonard 2011 , Bossong 2012 , MacKenzie et al. 2013 ). In contrast, institutional issues have overall been less studied, apart from some early works focusing on the legal intricacies of the then 'third pillar' (e.g. Bieber and Monar 1995), Kaunert's works (Kaunert 2005 , 2010a , 2010b , 2010c , Kaunert and Della Giovanna 2010 on the role of the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council in the AFSJ, as well as the emerging literature on the European Parliament's role (Ripoll Servent 2010 , Ripoll Servent and MacKenzie 2011 .
In contrast to the burgeoning literature on these issues, political scientists have, with the notable exception of Adler-Nissen (2009 , given only limited attention to the peculiar position of some states within the AFSJ, namely the UK, Ireland and Denmark.
Those have chosen not to engage fully with the current EU integration process in the field of justice and internal security, which has led to the development of 'differentiated integration' (Adler-Nissen 2009) or 'variable geometry' (Usher 1997) in JHA (now the AFSJ). Although there are variations amongst these three states, the main reason underpinning the stance of their government is that they wish to maintain control over matters that they view as being of key importance to their national sovereignty, in particular immigration, asylum, and security policies (Wallace 1997) . In the specific case of the UK, the government considers that not all EU justice and internal security measures favour its national interests, which have been constructed around the protection of its common law system and its unique geographical characteristics (Cameron 2013 , Home Office 2013a . Successive British governments have therefore been opposed to joining the Schengen zone, for example, because they have continued to emphasise border controls rather than internal security measures, such as the mandatory registration of all national and non-national residents with the police, which is in force in many other EU Member States. Finally, it is important to note that the position of the UK within the AFSJ is made even more peculiar by the existence of three legal systemsnamely one each for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland -, as well as the ongoing process of devolution that has seen the transfer of several functions to national parliaments or assemblies, namely the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Again, this is a peculiarity of the UK's position within the AFSJ that has been largely overlooked in the scholarly literature to date.
Justice and internal security in Scotland and multi-level governance
The most adequate way to analyse the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland is arguably through the use of an MLG framework, which is best suited to capture all the nuances of such a complex situation. MLG refers to the idea that there has been a general and gradual shift from state-centralised power to the existence of multiple centres of power, including supranational, regional, and local centres (Hooghe and Marks 2001) . Given the devolution of certain functions to Scotland and the decision to grant the EU increasing competences in the field of justice and internal security, albeit with specific restrictions when it comes to some Member States such as the UK, it is argued here that an MLG framework is particularly adequate to shed light on the evolution of justice and internal security governance 9 in Scotland. On the one hand, it is important to include the EU level in the analysis, as the EU now exercises some important competences over certain aspects of justice and internal security. On the other hand, it is equally important to also consider the UK level, as the British government and Parliament have retained some important competences in justice and internal security. They thereby play an important role as intermediary between Scotland and the EU, as will be shown later in this article when analysing the current debates on the JHA block opt-out.
Over the past twenty years, the academic literature on MLG has flourished, which has notably led to various refinements and re-interpretations of the concept (see Stephenson 2013) . MLG has been mainly used as a framework for analysing the decentralisation of political systems and their policy-making mechanisms (e.g. Conzelmann and Smith 2008 , Cairney 2012 , Levi-Faur 2012 , Kohler-Koch and Larat 2009 . It has promoted an understanding of the EU as a dynamic polity, which is distinct from international organisations and is characterised to a significant extent by the same features as a domestic political system (Bache and Flinders 2004, Hix 1994) . This has led to the development of a more dynamic and complex view of policy-making processes, which are seen as being characterised by power diffusion through negotiation from a centralised state to a large number of bodies at different hierarchical levels -both above and below the national level (Hooghe and Marks 2010 , Richards and Smith 2004 , Kohler-Koch 1998 .
The remainder of this section examines the governance of justice and internal security matters in Scotland through the lenses of MLG. It highlights the vertical process of power diffusion (Marks 1993, Marks and Hooghe 2004 ) that has led to the current distribution of competences over the various aspects of justice and internal security between the Scottish, British and EU levels. It also examines the institutional arrangements governing the relations between the different levels.
The Scottish jurisdictional level
The location of some justice and internal security competences at the Scottish jurisdictional level derives from the Scotland Act 1998, although it is important to note that Scotland had retained a distinct legal system following the adoption of the Acts of Union in 1707. Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 lists all matters reserved to the UK Parliament; the matters that are not mentioned in this section are devolved to the Scottish Parliament (see Cairney 2006 , Scott 2011 ). In the field of justice and internal security, the devolved areas include most aspects of criminal law and civil law, the prosecution system, the court system and the police.
Since devolution, major reviews of different parts of the criminal justice system have taken place, resulting in new primary and secondary legislation (Eski et al. 2011, pp. 10-13) . those that deal with devolved matters with Scottish jurisdiction and structures, those that deal with reserved matters, but also have Scottish jurisdiction and structures, and those that deal with reserved matters and have British jurisdiction and structures.
The British jurisdictional level
Whilst some matters have been devolved to Scotland, Schedule 5 of the Scotland Act 1998 specifies a series of matters that are reserved to the UK Parliament ('reserved matters') and on which the Scottish Parliament cannot therefore legislate. Those include various matters that belong to, or are at least related to, the realm of internal security, namely defence; money laundering; the misuse of drugs; firearms; control of weapons; extradition; data protection; immigration and nationality, including asylum, the issue of travel documents and free movement of persons; as well as national security, the interception of communications, official secrets and terrorism. Importantly, foreign affairs, including the relations with the EU, are also a reserved matter.
There are two other important issues that should be mentioned when considering the relations between the Scottish and British levels in the field of justice and internal security. The first is the 'Sewel Convention'. Section 28 (7) 
The EU jurisdictional level
The governance of justice and internal security matters in Scotland is also significantly influenced by developments at the EU level, since the UK has been a Member State of the EU since 1973. After several years of intergovernmental cooperation outside of the framework of the European Community, notably within the Trevi group, the EU was granted 13 its first competences on internal security and justice matters by the Treaty of Maastricht.
Article K.1 of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union (1993) stated that '[for] the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the freedom of movement of persons, and without prejudice to the powers of the European Community, Member states shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest (…)'. There were nine areas of common interest, namely (1) asylum policy; (2) external border control; (3) immigration (entry, circulation, stay and fight against illegal immigration); (4) fight against drugs and (5) against international crime; (6) judicial cooperation in civil matters and (7) in criminal matters; (8) customs cooperation; and (9) police cooperation. However, the new treaty placed these issues in the separate so-called 'third pillar' of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (alongside the European Community (first pillar) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar)). Cooperation on these matters was therefore formalised, but continued mainly on an intergovernmental basis as previously (Geddes 2000, p. 86) . As a result, policy progress under the Treaty of Maastricht remained limited (Uçarer 2001, p. 6 ).
In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force and gave a strong impetus to the development of JHA policies, which were re-labelled the 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (AFSJ). This change was not merely cosmetic, but signalled the rise in prominence of justice and internal security cooperation in the EU. Whereas JHA cooperation had concerned 'matters of common interest', which had to be regarded as such by Member States '[for] the purposes of achieving the objectives of the Union' (Article K.1 TEU), the realisation of the AFSJ was identified as an objective in its own right. The Treaty of Amsterdam stipulated that 'the Union's objective shall be to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the member states (…)'.
In order to achieve this ambitious plan, significant changes were made to the institutional 14 arrangements governing JHA matters, which resulted in a partial communitarisation of the third pillar. Controls on the external borders, asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation on civil matters were all transferred to the first pillar. Nevertheless, the incorporation of these areas into the first pillar was to take place gradually, although it had to be completed within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. As for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, they were to remain in the third pillar. This partial communitarisation was seen by the British government as potentially threatening national sovereignty. This led to the adoption of various protocols that were attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, including those establishing the opt-ins and opt-outs enjoyed by the UK, which will be examined in greater detail later in this article. has also highlighted what it perceives as a lack of Scottish influence over UK policies and dealings with Brussels in several specific areas that are highly important to Scotland, such as fisheries, renewable energy and marine legislation (Guardian 2011) . This is because, whilst the Scottish government is allowed to contribute to Westminster discussions about EU proposals that concern devolved matters, the British government is actually not obliged to incorporate the views of the Scottish government into its positions for EU-level negotiations (Scottish Government 2013b, p. 458) .
Having examined how the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland is currently organised across three levels (Scotland, UK, EU), it is now possible to consider how this system of governance could be significantly influenced by the result of the Scottish independence referendum of 18 September 2014.
The Scottish independence referendum of 2014
Justice and internal security matters have not featured prominently in the debates in the runup to the Scottish referendum. There has been significantly more emphasis on the economy, which has also been shown to be the issue that most heavily influence a 'yes' or a 'no' vote (Guardian 2014a ). This general lack of attention given to justice and internal security issues may also be explained by the fact that a 'yes' vote in the referendum would not lead to momentous change in this policy area. As previously noted, several justice and internal security matters have already been devolved to Scotland. In contrast, certain matters are reserved to the UK, such as counter-terrorism and legislation on the misuse of drugs. The Scottish government has suggested that, should these reserved matters become Scottish competences, as would be the case after independence, new legislation could be adopted in order to better address the actual security threats faced by Scotland or to make policy measures more consistent with the Scottish criminal justice system (Scottish Government
2007, p. 11). In particular, it has identified the following issues as priorities in an independent
Scotland: firearms, road traffic offences and drink driving, gambling and drugs (Scottish Government 2013b, p. 258). It has also hinted at a more socio-economic approach to crime, by emphasising the possibilities offered by independence to use employment, housing, education and other welfare measures to tackle deprivation and crime in communities (Scottish Government 2013b, p. 258) . However, to date, the Scottish government has allowed the British government to legislate upon a significant range of devolved policing and criminal justice matters by way of Legislative Consent Motions (Scottish Government 2012), as explained before. As such decisions entail an implicit recognition that it is advantageous for Scotland to see the adoption of UK-wide measures on a series of issues, this could be interpreted by some as weakening the case for independence, at least as far as justice and internal security matters are concerned. Furthermore, an independent review of policing published by the Scottish government has found that chief police officers strongly felt that tackling some issues, such as terrorism, required a UK-wide approach (Scottish Government 2009, p. 60) . Therefore, it is unclear to what precise extent Scotland would gain by receiving additional competences in justice and internal security following independence. This may explain why the Scottish government has not drawn much attention to these issues in its promotion of a 'yes' vote at the referendum.
At the same time, the British government has, for its part, decided to highlight certain potential burdens relating to justice and internal security matters for Scotland if it were to become an independent country. Amongst those are the costs and difficulties of creating Scottish security facilities, such as an independent intelligence service, as well as the challenge of gaining trust and cooperation from the intelligence agencies of other countries.
David Lidington, a Foreign Office minister, has claimed that Scotland would face billions of pounds in costs in order to develop new security facilities and to set up secure communications for its intelligence agencies before it could persuade MI5, MI6, the CIA and other allies to begin to cooperate. According to Lidington, ' [it] would require all members of that community to be satisfied both that it was to their overall advantage in terms of intelligence gathering and sharing […] and most importantly for them, to have confidence in the ability of an independent Scotland's safeguarding of that information' (The Guardian, 2013 On this basis, what are the potential outcomes of the Scottish independence referendum for the governance of internal security and justice in Scotland? This is a complex question because the referendum has both direct and indirect implications for this policy field, as will be later seen. First of all, if the referendum were to yield a 'no' result and Scotland were to remain part of the UK, most justice and internal security matters currently reserved to the UK would be likely to remain reserved in the near future. The British government would therefore continue to exercise very significant power over certain aspects of the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland (Scottish Government 2009, p. 60 ).
In addition, should Scotland remain inside the UK, the British opt-in and opt-out arrangements would continue to apply to Scotland. As foreign affairs matters are reserved to the UK government, the representation of Scottish issues and viewpoints would continue to be limited in EU negotiations. In this sense, the British jurisdictional level would continue in its role as an intermediary or 'gatekeeper' between Scotland and the EU, both in terms of leading decisions on opt-ins and opt-outs and formulating the UK's position on justice and home affairs matters in the EU. However, as will be discussed in greater detail in the following section, if the UK decided to use its right to a JHA block-opt out, this would immediately also apply to Scotland -despite the fact that Scotland has consistently argued against the block opt-out (Scottish Government 2013b, p. 504).
Secondly, if the independence referendum were to be won by the 'yes' camp and Scotland were to become an independent country, a number of important issues would be raised. and relationships failing to operate in the interim'. From this viewpoint, should the referendum yield a 'yes' vote, Scotland would therefore remain within the EU during the transition period between the referendum and the day of independence, which would see the negotiation of various important issues, including EU membership. This is also the position of the Scottish government. It has stated that the discussions on the process to ensure the transition to independent EU membership would take place 'during the period in which Scotland remains part of the UK and by extension, part of the EU' in order to protect the rights and interests of EU businesses and citizens in Scotland (Scottish Government 2013b, p.
220).
It can therefore be concluded from this analysis that there remains many uncertainties as to what exactly the consequences of a 'yes' vote in the independence referendum would be for the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. However, the impact of a 'no' vote is in no way clearer, as it would not necessarily entail stability and continuity. This is because, as it has already been alluded to in this section, the Scottish independence referendum is not the only factor that will influence the future of the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. Two other crucial factors to consider are the decision of the British government regarding the JHA block opt-out and the result of a possible referendum on the UK's membership of the EU. Commission could impose conditions on the UK's 'opt-back-in' and set a time period for those to be fulfilled.
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Such a block opt-out in the JHA field would have very significant consequences for the UK as a whole, including Scotland. Although police and judicial cooperation are largely devolved issues, foreign affairs, including relations with the EU, constitute a reserved matter. This means that any decision made by the British government in that respect would automatically affect Scotland as well. As emphasised by Brady (2013, p. 6) , Scotland 'has just as much at stake in EU co-operation on crime and policing as many individual member-states given the size of its population and the needs of its police in terms of internationally-related crime'.
However, it appears that there has not been any significant Scottish involvement in the governmental discussions about the JHA block opt-out to date. This is aptly illustrated by this statement made by Scottish National Party Member of Parliament Pete Wishart in July 2013:
'The Home Secretary has said on several occasions that she is speaking on behalf of the whole United Kingdom when it comes to these measures, but she will know that there is great unhappiness in the Scottish Government, Police Scotland, and the whole legal profession about this opt-out. Why was there so little consultation with the Scottish Government, why did they know nothing about this until last week, (…)?' (HC Deb, 15 July 2013, c776) . Thus, the possible exercise of the JHA block opt-out by the British government and all the uncertainties surrounding the 'opt-back-ins' have brought a considerable degree of instability to the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. In addition to the question marks surrounding the opt-out and 'opt-back-in' processes, it appears that the Scottish government has not been significantly involved in a decision that highly concerns it given its devolved competences.
However, the decision of the British government on the JHA block opt-out is not the only development at the British level that could also seriously affect the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. In the last few years, the issue of the UK's membership of the It can therefore be concluded that the independence referendum is definitely not the only event of importance for the future governance of justice and internal security in Scotland.
Both the British government's decision on the JHA block opt-out and the possible British referendum on EU membership also have the potential to significantly influence the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. This means that they should also be integrated as key variables in any analysis of the future development of justice and internal security governance in Scotland, alongside the result of the Scottish independence referendum.
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Conclusion
This article set out to identify the possible outcomes of the Scottish independence referendum regarding the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland. For that purpose, it began by analysing how justice and internal security matters are currently governed in Scotland. Because of the devolution of some of these matters to Scotland and the increasing competences of the EU in this area, it was argued that an MLG framework was best suited for examining justice and internal security governance in Scotland. The article subsequently analysed how internal security is governed at the Scottish, British and EU levels, as well as the arrangements for managing the relations between these three levels. In the following section, the article focused on the possible effects of the referendum by outlining the consequences of the 'no' and 'yes' results. It then highlighted that the Scottish referendum is not the only important event for the future governance of justice and internal security matters in Scotland. Two other issues could prove of crucial importance. Firstly, it will be important to see whether and, if yes, the extent to which the UK will continue to participate in JHA cooperation following the current debates on the UK's JHA block opt-out and the decision that will eventually be taken in that regard. Secondly, the very issue of the UK's continued membership of the EU may eventually be at stake should an 'in-out referendum' on EU membership be organised in the next few years.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First of all, the governance of justice and internal security matters in Scotland is extremely complex as competences in this area are exercised at three different levels. This governance system is rendered even more complicated by the peculiar position of the UK in the AFSJ with its various opt-ins and optouts. To make these arrangements even more convoluted, there could be significant changes to the UK's position in the AFSJ as a result of the current debates on the UK's JHA block 29 opt-out. In that respect, some important questions have been left unanswered to date, most notably whether the UK would be allowed to opt back into all the EU measures that it has selected. Thus, the governance of justice and internal security in Scotland is particularly complex, notably because of its dynamic character. Secondly, it is impossible to reliably predict the impact of the Scottish referendum on the governance of justice and internal security for three main reasons. The first is that the result of the referendum is still in doubt as of early 2014, especially as recent polls indicate that the gap between the 'yes' vote and the 'no' vote has recently narrowed (Scotsman, 2014) . The second is that there are a lot of uncertainties regarding the consequences of a 'yes' vote for the position of Scotland within the EU. Whilst some argue that Scotland would not find itself outside the EU if the referendum were to yield a 'yes' vote, others state that Scotland would have to apply for EU membership, which could entail difficult negotiations. Should the latter scenario turn out to be correct, this would have a major impact on the MLG of justice and internal security in Scotland. The third reason for which it is extremely difficult to predict the impact of the independence referendum is that the result of this referendum is not the only factor determining the future of the governance of justice and internal security matters in Scotland.
The referendum in Scotland is taking place amidst important debates at the UK level concerning the relationship between the UK and the EU. Of paramount importance in that respect will be the outcome of the current discussions on the UK's JHA block opt-out and, potentially, the result of an 'in-out referendum' on the UK's membership of the EU should it be organised in the near future. Those would mainly matter for Scotland if it were to remain in the UK, although they would also be of importance for Scotland even if it were independent from rUK because of its status as a neighbouring country (in the field of border controls, for example).
Therefore, at this stage, it is impossible to distinguish only two scenarios for justice and internal security governance in Scotland after the referendum depending on whether Scotland votes 'yes' or 'no'. One can only identify the various factors that will influence the future of justice and internal security governance in Scotland, namely whether Scotland votes for independence or not, whether a 'yes' vote leads to a temporary or permanent exclusion from the EU or not, whether the UK (or potentially rUK) continues to cooperate on JHA with its EU partners, and whether, even more fundamentally, the UK (or possibly rUK) remains a Member State of the EU. Because of the many uncertainties at play and the multiple variables at hand, there is actually a large number of possible scenarios for the future of justice and internal security governance in Scotland. Depending on the outcomes of these three events (the British government's decision on the JHA block opt-out, the Scottish referendum on independence, and the British referendum on EU membership), Scotland could find itself, for example, inside the UK, but outside the EU; inside the UK, but largely outside the AFSJ; or outside the UK, but inside the EU.
To conclude, this article has identified an important paradox in the run-up to the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014. The 'no' vote has usually been presented as a vote against risk and for continuity. However, this article has shown that, in a policy domain such as justice and internal security, a 'no' vote in the Scottish independence referendum could paradoxically lead to more changes should the British government more or less drastically reconfigure its relationship with the EU. In contrast, and assuming that Scotland remains in (or re-joins) the EU, the 'yes' vote could actually ensure more continuity in the governance of justice and internal security. 
